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KILLING KIDS: THE IMPACT OF
DOMINGUES V NEVADA ON THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY AS A VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Abstract: This Note examines the debate over the legality of the juvenile
death penalty, and concludes that the use of the juvenile death penalty
in the United States represents a flagrant transgression of international
human rights law. Several forms of international law, including a
number of multilateral human rights treaties, customary international
law and jus cogens prohibit the execution of children below the age of
eighteen. The existence of these contrary legal obligations demands
that the United States abandon its vigilante stance and bring its
practices into cot iformity With the greater international cot uniunity.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the issue of juvenile violence has received
significant public attention.' Tragedies such as those that occurred in
Littleton, Colorado and Little Rock, Arkansas, have generated height-
ened concern over bloodshed amongst America's young. The anger
and pain provoked by these highly publicized displays of juvenile vio-
lence have been reflected in the words and deeds of politicians who
call for tougher approaches to crime and increasingly severe criminal
sanctions.2 M a result, the juvenile justice system, founded on the idea
that childhood is a distinct stage of life, has slowly been disniantled. 3
The century-old notion of children and adolescents as less culpable
and more amenable to rehabilitation has given way to a harsher real-
ity where child criminals are frequently indistinguishable from their
I See Victor Swell), e Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions ,for Ju-
venile Crimes, January 1973-June 2000 (last modified June 2000) <http://www.law.ontLedu
/fitculty/streibijilvdeathiuml>.
2 See Richard Dieter, International Perspectives on the Death Penalty: A Costly Isolation for the
U.S. (last modified Oct. 1999) Chtlp://www.deat ►penaltyinfo.org/international-report .
html> (noting numerous calls by politicians to lower age of death eligibility, even to as low
as eleven); NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENAIXY, The U.S..leads the world
in killing kids (visited Apr. 15, 2000) Clittp://www.ncadp.org > (noting that in 1996 Missis-
sippi sought the deadt penalty for juveniles as young as thirteen).
3
 Margaret Talbot, What's Become of the Juvenile Delinquent, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 10,
2000, at 41.
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adult counterparts.4
 Since 1992, forty-five states have passed or
amended legislation making it easier to prosecute juveniles as adults. 5
Not only are more children being transferred out of the juvenile sys-
tem and into the adult, criminal system, but today, more juveniles are
receiving the ultimate sanction—the death penalty. 6
In January 2000 three juvenile offenders' were put to death. 8 As
of October 2000, seventy-four more awaited their fate on death row. 9
The United States crossed a significant barrier in 1999 when Sean
Sellers became the first sixteen-year-old offender executed in over
forty years. 1° Explaining this increase in juvenile death sentences and
executions, Texas juvenile delinquency expert Billy Bramlett noted
that death sentences suit the citizenry "fed up with the expense of
crime, the fear of crime, the devastation of crime and just the sense-
lessness of crime." 11
 Indeed, the majority of Americans continue to
support the death penalty—even as applied to children."
Nonetheless, while executions in the United States in the mod-
ern era13
 have continued- to climb, this fact is in direct contrast to
movement within the greater international community. 14 The United
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See Streit), supra note 1. Thirty-three juvenile offenders were under death sentences
at the close of 1983, compared to seventy-four juvenile offenders today: a 124% increase.
See also Dieter, supra note 2 (explaining that executions in 1999 will reach record numbers,
including execution of more juvenile offenders).
7
 As used throughout this Note, the term 'juvenile offender" describes an individual
who committed a crime before the age of eighteen—the most common age dividing line
between juvenile and criminal courts. See Streib, supra note 1. Due to the lengthy appeals
process, actual executions of juvenile offenders typically occur years after the sentencing,
when the defendant is no longer a juvenile. See id.
8 See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (last modified Sept. 27, 2000) <Imp://
www.cleathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexec00.11tml > thereinafter DPW].
9 See DPIC, supra note 8 (visited Oct. 7, 2000) at Chttp://www. deathpenaltyinfo.org/
juvchar.html>; Streit), supra note 1.
10 See Dieter, supra note 2; L. Romano, Reaching Out as Time is Running Out, WAsu.
PosT, Jan. 22, 1999, at A8. Despite pleas from Desmond Tutu, the ABA, and other religious
and human rights leaders, and despite documented mental illness, Sellers was executed in
Oklahoma in 1999. See Dieter, supra note 2.
rt See Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation Provide
a Sanctuary for the juvenile Death Penalty, 32 U.S.F.L. REV. 735, 742 (1998).
12 Seee. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Death Penalty News, AI Index: ACT 53/05/00, Dec.
1999. Amnesty International reports may be found on the World Wide Web at <Imp://
i.vww.anuteSty.org/ailib/theines/indxdp.hun >.
13
 The "modern" American death penalty era began when new death penalty statutes
were passed following the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, which in
effect struck down all then-existing death penalty statutes. See Streib, supra note 1, at 11.2.
14 See Dieter, supra note 2; Streib, supra note 1.
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States currently stands nearly alone in a world where executing peo-
ple for crimes committed as children is considered a major human
rights violation. 15 This international legal and moral consensus
against the juvenile death penalty is symbolized in large part by ex-
press provisions in a number of multilateral human rights treaties."
Despite claiming an authoritative stance on international human
rights issues, the United States has declined to ratify several of these
treaties and has reserved the right not to implement important provi-
sions of other treaties, in an effort to maintain discretion over the
execution of juvenile offenders. 17
Given America's tendency to condemn human rights violations
on foreign soil, it is imperative that the United States begin to exam-
hte the legally-sanctioned practices that present similar human rights
concerns here at home—the juvenile death penalty. The United
States' position on the juvenile death penalty is both embarrassing
and hypocritical." More significantly, however, the vigilante stance the
United States has assumed violates existing international law prohibit-
ing the juvenile death penalty." America, therefore, no longer has the
discretion to continue to move in the opposite direction of an inter-
national consensus that has rejected the juvenile death penalty on
human rights grounds."
The existence of international law prohibiting the execution of
children demands that the U.S. Supreme Court address the glaring
violation that current U.S. practice presents. In 1999, when Michael
Domingues petitioned the Court for review of his juvenile death pen-
alty case, the Court requested the Solicitor General to present the
U.S. government's position with respect to the legality of juvenile exe-
cutions under international law." Richard Dieter, death penalty
scholar and executive director of the Death Penalty Information Cen-
ter, captured the significance of this request noting, "Mlle Clinton
19 See Dieter, supra note 2.
16 See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text
19 See Dieter, supra note 2.
19 See, e.g., Victor Streib, The juvenile Death Penalty in the. United Slates and Worldwide, 4
LoY. POVERTY L.J. 173,174 (1998); Dieter, supra note 2; Cathleen E. Hull, Comment, "En-
lightened by a Humane justice": An International Law Argument Against the juvenile Death Penalty,
47 U. KAN. L. REv. 1079,1081 (1999).
20 See, e.g., Streih, supra note 19, at 174; Hull, supra note 19, at 1081.
21 See Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 127(1 (Nev. 1998), request for Solicitor General's Brief
filed, 119 S. Ct. 2044 (June 7, 1999) •(No. 98-8324) I hereinafter Request for Solicitor Gen-
eral's Brief].
1178	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:1175
Administration [has] a unique opportunity to directly affect U.S. pol-
icy on [this] issue, ..."22 Unfortunately, the U.S. Solicitor General's
October 1999 brief made it overwhelmingly clear that the govern-
ment continues to support the use of the juvenile death penalty, de-
spite contrary international indications. 23
This Note explores the use of the juvenile death penalty in the
United States within the context of international law, concluding that
the U.S. practice of executing juvenile offenders represents a
significant violation of international human rights law. 24 Section I re-
views the background of the juvenile death penalty in the United
States and considers several of the rationales offered for banning the
practice. 25 The Section further considers the constitutional challenges
and multilateral treaties that specifically address the juvenile death
penalty. 26 Section. II provides a brief discussion of the sources and
foundations of international law to serve as a basis for understanding
the manner in which international law applies to the juvenile death
penalty. 27 Section III discusses the case of Domingues v. Nevada, in
which a juvenile offender sentenced to death by the Supreme Court
of Nevada petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review on interna-
tional law grounds. 28 The Section evaluates the persuasiveness of the
arguments presented both by the Petitioner, as well as by the Solicitor
General—whose recommendation for denial of certiorari was ac-
cepted by the Court. 29 This case serves as an example of how interna-
tional law is increasingly relevant , to death penalty challenges and
demonstrates the government's position on this important issue."
Section IV presents an analysis of the international law arguments,
highlighting deficiencies in the Solicitor General's recommendation
and arguing that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari
to review these critical international law issues. 31 Section V argues that
foreign practice must be acknowledged as an indicator of evolving
22 Dieter, supra note 2.
23 See Solicitor General's Amiens Brief on Behalf of the United States, Dotningues v.
Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998) (No. 98-8327) thereinafter Solicitor General's Brief].
21 See infra notes 208-336 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 33-67 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 68-101 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 102-149 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 150-156 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 160-207 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 160-207 and accompanying text.
Sr
 See infra notes 208-297 and accompanying text.
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standards of decency and that the Court should reconsider the consti-
tutionality of the juvenile death penalty, 32
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A. History
Although the death penalty has been imposed sparingly in juve-
nile cases, the number of children sentenced to death in the United
States is nonetheless significant." Since the first execution of a juve-
nile offender in 1642 in Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 357 indi-
viduals have been executed in the United States for juvenile crimes. 34
In the twenty-six months between April 1998 and June 2000, eight ju-
venile offenders were executed in the United States." Although juve-
nile executions account for only a small number of total executions
nationwide, the percentage of such executions appears to be tising. 36
Currently, thirty-eight states and the federal government have
statutes authorizing the death penalty." Of those thirty-nine death
penalty jurisdictions, twenty-four permit the execution of juvenile of-
fenders." In contrast, as of October 1999, at least 144 nations prohib-
ited, by treaty or legislation, the juvenile death penalty. 39 Conse-
quently, the United States is one of only six countries known to have
32 See infix notes 298-336 and accompanying text.
33 See Slreib, supra note 1.
34 See id.
35 See id.; DPW, supra note 8 (last modified Sept. 2000) at Chttp://www. deatbpenalty-
info.org/facts.litml#Executions>. Seventeen juvenile offenders have been executed dur-
ing the modern era of the American death' penalty and as °finite 2000, 196 juvenile death
sentences have hem imposed. See Streib, supra note 1.
3C.
	
Weil), saliva note 19. Juvenile executions constitute approximately 1.8% of ap-
proximately 19,000 confirmed American executions since 1608. See id. Since the rein-
statement of the death penalty in 1976, juvenile executions have accounted for approxi-
mately 3% of executions. See id.
37 See Streib, supra note 1.
38. See id. Of the thirty-nine death penalty jurisdictions, fifteen have expressly chosen
the age of eighteen at the time of the offense as the minimum age for death penalty eligi-
bility. See id. Four jurisdictions have chosen the age of seventeen as the minimum. See id.
The remaining twenty states use the age of sixteen as the minimum age, either through an
express age in the statute or by court ruling. See id.
33 See Dicier, supra note 2. Ironically, some of the countries which prohibit the use of
the dead! penalty on juveniles arc the saine countries that are frequent targets of U.S.
I nun a n rights criticism: South Africa, China, Syria, Cuba. SeeM.INEsTv INTERNATIONAL, The
Death Penalty Worldwide.. Developments in 1999, Al Index: ACT 50/04/00, Apr. 2000 [herein-
after Death Penalty Worldwide].
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executed a juvenile offender in the last decade. 4° Moreover, the
United States leads the world in juvenile executions, having executed
as many juvenile offenders in the last decade as the other five coun-
tries combined."
B. Rationale Behind the Movement to Ban the Juvenile Death Penalty
A variety of different beliefs and concerns have motivated the
greater international community to prohibit the juvenile death pen-
alty. For one, it has been widely recognized that many children who
turn to violent crime have suffered childhood's fraught with abuse,
impoverishment and neglect. 42 Amnesty . International recently re-
ported that "Nile background of the majority of juvenile offenders
executed since 1990 was one of serious emotional or material depriva-
tion."" The story of Joseph Cannon, executed in July 1998 for a mur-
der committed as a juvenile, highlights the way in which a juvenile
offender's background May affect one's perception of their criminal
conduct: 44 As a result of a serious car accident, physical and mental
disabilities left Joseph Cannon unable to function in the classroom
and eventually led to his expulsion from school at the age of seven. 45
After that point, Joseph received no further formal education." By
the time he turned ten, he was diagnosed with organic brain dam-
age.47
 Severe depression led him to attempt suicide at fifteen, at which
time he was diagnosed as schizophrenic and borderline mentally re-
tarded." Throughout his life, Joseph repeatedly was subjected to se-
40 See Death Penalty Worldwide, supra note 39, at Table offuvenile Offenders.
41 See id. Between January 1990 and December 1999, executions of individuals for
crimes committed under age eighteen were as follows: Iran (5), Nigeria (I), Pakistan (2),
Saudi Arabia (1), Yemen (1) and the U.S. (10). See id. As of October 2000, the United
States had executed an additional four juvenile offenders. See DPIC, supra note 8, (last
modified Sept. 2000) at Chttp://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts.hunl#Executions >.
While only one juvenile was executed internationally since 1997, eight juvenile offenders
were executed in the United States during the same period. See Death Penalty Worldwide,
supra note 39, at Table ofjuvenile Offenders; DPIC, supra note 8 (last modified Sept. 2000)
at Clutp://www.deatlipenaltyinlb.org/facts.html#
 Executions>. Ebrahint Qorbanzadeb,
the single juvenile executed internationally, was executed in Iran in October 1999. See
Death Penalty Mrldwide, supra note 39, at Table of juvenile Offenders.
42 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Juveniles and the Death Penalty, Al Index: ACT
50/11/98, Nov. 1998 [hereinafierftwemles and the Death Penalty].
43 Id.
44 see id.
45 See id.
48 See id.
47
 See Juveniles and the Death Penalty, supra note 42.
as See id.
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vere sexual abuse from male relatives 4 9 So brutal and abusive was his
upbringing that Joseph excelled more on death row, where he
learned to read and write for the first time, than he ever had outside
prison walls."
Joseph's 1998 execution demonstrates an alarming truth about
the vast majority of children sentenced to death: childhood crimes
represent not only a juvenile's terrible mistake, but also the drastic
failures of families, schools and social systems. 51 Shocking in its own
right, the greater tragedy presented by Joseph's example rests in the
fact that the majority of juvenile offenders sentenced to death share
similarly depraved and abused backgrounds. 52 A study conducted by
the American Journal of Psychiatry of fourteen juvenile offenders on
death row reinforces this assertion." Of the fourteen juveniles stud-
ied, only two had I.Q. scores higher than ninety; every one of them
had suffered severe head trauma during childhood; all had deep psy-
chiatric problems; and only two were spared extreme physical or sex-
ual abuse as children." Only five of the juveniles studied had had the
benefit of these psychological evaluations before standing trial." This
has contributed to the belief, accepted by the majority of the interna-
tional community, that a juvenile offender's culpability frequently is
diminished.56 This belief is one of many which has inspired numerous
international organizations and treaties to condemn and prohibit the
juvenile death penalty.57
In addition, the international .prohibition against executing juve-
nile offenders recognizes that the practice does not logically comport
with the traditional justifications for capital punishment." Theories
such as deterrence and retribution fall short of justifying capital pun-
46 See id.
50 See id.
51 See id.; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,834 (1988) (quoting &Wings v. Okla-
homa, 455 U.S. 104,115 n.11 (1982)).
52 See Juveniles and the Death Penalty, supra note 42; Christopher Hitchens, Old Enough to
Die, VANITY FAIRJUIIC 1999, at 80.
53 See Dorothy Ounow Lewis, et al., Neuropsychiattic, Psychoeducational, and Family Char-
acteiistics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584
(1988).
54 Lewis, supra note 53, at 584-89.
55 See id.; Kitchens, supra note 52, at 80.
56 See Juveniles and the Death Penalty, suln:a note 42; Vega, supra note 11, at 744-45.
57 See Streit), .supra note 1.
" See Etta J. Mullin, At Vl'hat Age Should They Did The United Stales Supreme Court Decision
with Respect to Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Mis-
souri, 16'r. MARSHALL L. REV. 161, 186-88 (1990).
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ishment when considering the unique attributes of juvenile offend-
ers. 59 With respect to deterrence, scientific studies consistently fail to
find convincing evidence that the death penalty deters crimes more
effectively than other punishments. 60
 Recognizing this fact, U.S. At-
torney General Janet Reno recently noted: "I have inquired for most
of my adult life about studies that might show that the death penalty is
a deterrent. And I have not seen any research that would substantiate
that point."61 Deterrence is arguably even less persuasive when con-
sidering a juvenile offender, given evidence of the inability of children
to comprehend• long-term consequences. 62 Psychological and socio-
logical reports show that juveniles live in an "intense present" whereby
the "past and future seem pallid by comparison."65
The retributive theory similarly is flawed," As Justice . Brennan
noted in his dissent to the 1989 case of Stanford v. Kentucky, "Retribu-
tion as a justification for executing offenders very much depends on
the degree of their culpability. Executing juveniles does not measura-
bly contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets
his just deserts."65
 Similarly, the American Bar Association recently
noted, "retribution . . . seems difficult enough for a government to
justify where adult offenders are involved . . . vengeance against chil-
dren for their misdeeds seems quite beyond justification. . ."66 Addi-
tional considerations, such as inadequate access to counsel, poverty
and race discrimination :provide further impetus for the decision em-
braced by the greater international community to stop sentencing
children to death. 67
39 See id.
60 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Fads and Figures on the Death Penally, AI Index: ACT
50/02/99, Apr. 1999 [hereinafter Facts and Figures an the Death Penalty].
61 See DPIC, supra note 8 (visited Oct. 7, 2000) at <http://www.deathpenalty  info.org/
whatsnew.html>. In addition, Time Magazine reported that 52% of Americans do not be-
lieve that the death penalty deters people from committing crime. See
62 See hftdlin, supra note 58, at 188 ("Juveniles live for ihe moment and tend to act out
of impulse rather than coldly calculating the risk").
63 See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837 (noting that likelihood that teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to possibility of execution is
so remote as to be virtually nonexistent); Vega, supra note I I, at 744.
64 See Mifflin, supra note 58, at 187.
63 See 492 U.S. 361, 403 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982)).
66 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Betraying the Young: Children in the US Justice System, AI
Index: ACT 51/60/98, Nov. 1998 (hereinafter Betraying the Youngl.
67 See, e.g., Vega, supra note 11, at 746-47; Streib, supra note I, at 13. This Note in no
way attempts an exhaustive analysis of these many rationales. It is sufficient merely to ac-
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C. Constitutional Challenges to the juvenile Death Penalty
Although U.S. policy. remains unaffected by the aforementioned
rationales for prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, these concerns
have received the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court over the
course of the past two decades. 68 The Court's opinions in Thompson v.
Oklahoma and Stanford v. Kentucky evidence the complicated, contro-
versial nature of this debate. 69
In 198$, the U.S. Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Thompson held
that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to a fifteen-
year-old child." There, the juvenile offender, in concert with three
adults, participated in the brutal murder of his former brother-in-
law." The Court evaluated the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty in light of the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and un-
usual punishment," following the guidance of the 1958 decision of
Trop v. Dulles. 72 Inn Trop, the Court found that in considering the pa-
rameters of the Eighth Amendment, future judges should be guided
by "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society."'" Based on this, the Thompson Court explained that the
applicable standard under which to judge the juvenile death penalty
must be progressive, informed and enlightened by humane justice."
In applying this guidance to the Thompson facts, the Court looked
to both legislative enactments and jury determinations as indicators
of whether evolving standards of decency required preventing Okla-
homa from imposing the death penalty on a fifteen-year-old defen-
dant." The Court also emphasized that the views of the international
community are relevant in determining whether punishment is cruel
knowledge the variety of motivations that have inspired provisions prohibiting the juvenile
death penalty within several major human rights treaties.
6g See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815.
69 See 492 U.S. at 361; 487 U.S. at 815.
79 See 487 U.S. at 838.
71 See id. at 819.
12 See id. at 821; 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Eighth Amendment provides, -1 clx-
cessive bail shall not he required, nor excessive lines imposed, nor and and unusual pu n-
ishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
73 See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (quoting nvp, 356 U.S. at 101).
74 See id. at 823 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373-74 (1910), which
noted It Hie [cruel and unusual punishment clause] ... may be therefore progressive,
and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as published opinions be-
come enlightened by humane justice.").
75 See id. at 822.
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and unusual. 78
 The review of these several indicators of contemporary
standards of decency led the Court to conclude that because of their
age and relative immaturity, juveniles are incapable of acting with the
degree of culpability necessary to justify the death penalty. 77 The
Court therefore held that sentencing juvenile offenders below the age
of sixteen to death violated.the Eighth Amendment by offending civi-
lized standards of decency.78
Only a year later, in 1989, the Court again addressed an Eighth
Amendment challenge to juvenile executions in Stanford v. Kentucky. 79
Although the Court's reasoning was similar to that in Thompson, the
Stanford plurality reached the opposite conclusiOn, finding that no his-
torical or modern consensus forbid the imposition of capital punish-
ment on sixteen or seventeen-year-olds. 8° Consequently, the Court
held that the juvenile death penalty did not offend the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 81 In
Stanford, the juvenile offender was sentenced to death for a murder
he committed at the age of seventeen.82 Although the Court again
considered whether the juvenile death penalty violated evolving stan-
dards of decency, the Court focused primarily on the abundance of
state statutes permitting juvenile executions as evidence of these stan-
dards. 83 The Court reasoned that since death penalty statutes are
passed by elected representatives, these statutes are indicative of a
public consensus in support of the juvenile death penalty. 84 The Court
rejected the petitioner's contention that public opinion polls and
views of interest groups 'should also be considered as indicators of a
consensus 8s Moreover, in contrast to the reasoning of the Thompson
78 See id. at 831 n.31. Amnesty International, the International Human Rights Group,
the ABA and the American Law Institute (A1..1) contributed to amicus briefs opposing the
juvenile death penalty. See Ved Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death
Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. Rev. 1311,1332-34 (1993). Other professional organizations also
filed briefs opposing the juvenile death penalty. See id. at 1334.
77 See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836-37. As part of this consideration, the Court noted that
Oklahoma, the state of original jurisdiction, recognized a basic distinction between juve-
niles and adults—in Oklahoma, minors cannot vote, sit on a jury, marry without parental
consent, or purchase alcohol or cigarettes. See id. at 823-24.
78 See id. at 838.
78 See 492 U.S. at 361.
80 See id. at 380; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
81
 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
82 See id. at 30.
" See id. at 370-71.
84 See id. at 370.
85 See id. at 377.
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Court just one year earlier, the Stanford Court specifically declined to
take into account the sentencing practices of other countries, noting,
"it is the American conceptions of decency that are dispositive."86
Based on these "American conceptions," the Court held that sentenc-
ing the seventeen-year-old defendant to death did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. 87 In so holding, the Stanford Court devel-
oped the standard that remains applicable today: in the United States,
the juvenile death penalty is constitutional as applied to sixteen and
seventeen-year-old defendants. 88
D. Multilateral Treaties Prohibiting the Imposition of the Juvenile
Death Penalty
In contrast to the Supreme Court's decision in Stanford, the con-
sensus Of the international community points toward strictly prohibit-
ing the practice of executing juvenile offenders. 89 This consensus is
reflected in a number of multilateral treaties explicitly prohibiting the
imposition of the juvenile death penalty." The United States has
signed several treaties which include such prohibitions, but has man-
aged to avoid compliance with these terms by either refusing to ratify
the treaty or, as in the case of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR"), by making reservations to the provisions
prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. 91
The ICCPR, an outgrowth of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, constitutes the cornerstone of modern international hu-
man rights law, seeking to recognize the inherent dignity and inalien-
86
 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.1. Unlike Thompson, the Stanford Court was not persuaded
by the numerous miens briefs filed by organizations opposing the death penalty. See
Nanda, supra note 76, at 1334-35. In his dissent, justice Brennan indicates that the plural-
ity considered the development of a consensus too narrowly and advocates considering the
views of organizations with expertise on the issue and the chokes of governments else-
where in the world. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
e7 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
al3
 See id.
89 See id.; Betraying the Young, supra note 66.
g° See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec, 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172 (1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; The Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug, 12, 1949, 6 TIAS
3516, 3365 [hereinafter The Fourth Geneva Convention]; American Convention on Hu-
man Rights, concluded Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123, reprinted in BURNS D. WESTON ET
AL,, SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, 453— .
68 (1997) [hereinafter ACIiR]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, concluded Nov. 20,
1989, 30 I.L.M. 1448, reprinted in BURNS I i. WESTON ET AL., SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC Docu-
MENTS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 562-87 (1997) [hereinafter CRC].
St See Dieter, supra note 2.
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able rights of all people by guaranteeing certain civil and political
freedoms.92
 Among the rights provided by the treaty, Article 6(5)
specifies that the "[s]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.. .."93
 Article 4 of
the ICCPR makes this provision nonderogable, even in times of public
emergency "which threaten the life of the nation. ..."94 This "non-
derogability" provision essentially means that while parties to the
treaty may take measures deviating from their obligations to many of
the provisions of the treaty, the drafters deemed Article 6(5), the ju-
venile death penalty provision, to be of such paramount importance
to the mission of the treaty that no derogation was permissible. 95 De-
spite this command, the Senate's 1992 ratification of the ICCPR was
made subject to certain reservations, understandings and declarations
("RUDs") among which was a reservation to Article 6(5) stating: "the
United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional con-
straints, to impose capital punishment on any person . . including
. . . persons below eighteen years of age."96
The United States' yeservation to Article 6(5) is significant, not
only for the substance of the reservation itself, but also because it
manifests the solitary stance of the United States on this issue: the
United States is currently the only country among the treaty's 144
signatories with a reservation to Article 6(5).97 Sincere dissatisfaction
with the United States' refusal to comply with Article 6(5) has been
expressed not only by international organizations, but similarly by
eleven foreign nations who have filed complaints with the Human
Rights Commission (the commission in charge of monitoring compli-
ance with the terms of the ICCPR). 99
92
 See ICCPR, supra note 90; William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United Slates Still a Party?, 21 BRoom. J. INT'L L
277, 277 (1995). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly in 1948, proclaimed a series of political, civil, economic, social and cultnral
rights as a universal standard. See Dieter, supra note 2.
9S ICCPR, supra note 90, art. 6(5).
94 See id. art. 4(3).
95 See id. art. 4 (2)
99 See 138 CONG. Rec. S4781-0I (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) at 54783. The United States
ratified the ICCPR in 1992, over-two decades after its adoption by the General Assembly in
1966. See id,
97 See Dieter, supra note 2; Schabas, supra note 92, at 290.
99 See Dieter, supra note 2. These objecting countries are among the United States'
closest allies: France, Sweden, - Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, NetherlandS,
Norway, Portugal and Spain. See id.
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The ICCPR is not the only treaty demonstrating U.S. unwilling-
ness to comply with the international consensus against the juvenile
death penalty. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War ("Fourth Geneva Convention"),
ratified by the United States in 1955, similarly forbids the imposition
of the death penalty on "protected persons" below the age of eight-
een. 99 In addition, the American Convention on Human Rights
("ACHR") and the Convention on Rights of the Child ("CRC") explic-
itly prohibit the death penalty for individuals whose crimes were
committed below the age of eighteen.'" While the United States par-
ticipated in the drafting and signing of both of these treaties, it has
been unwilling as yet to ratify.tot
II. SOURCES AND FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law generally is considered to be derived from the
sources listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice OM.'" These sources, regarded as substantial means for the
determination of rules of law, include: international conventions and
established rules expressly recognized by contesting states; interna-
tional custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and judicial de-
cisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations.'"
The first source listed in Article 38, "international conventions,"
is simply another name for treaties. 10'1 Treaties are international
agreements containing the mutual promises of signatory states—as
such, they represent an especially strong source of international
law.w5 International treaties signed and ratified by the United States
99 SeeThe Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 90. The Fourth Geneva Convention,
dated August 12, 1949, was signed by 154 nations, including the United States, who ratified
the treaty in July 1955. See id. This treaty has limited applicability because it only comes
into force during times of war or occupation. See id. As an indication of an international
consensus it is nonetheless persuasive. See id.
SreACIIR, supra note 90, art. 4(5); CRC, supra note 90, art. 37(a).
rot See Dieter, supra note 2.
102 See BURNS IL WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 76 (1997).
The ICJ, popularly known as the World Court, is the principal judicial organ of the U.N.
See id.
1 " See Statute of the International Court of Justice, concluded June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, reprinted in BURNS 1 -1. WESTON ET AL., SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 36 (1997) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
► 01 See icd Statute, supra note 103; WEsToN, supra note 102, at 77.
1 °5 SeeMsToN, supra note 102, at 77.
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are laws of the United States and are supreme over the laws of the
several states. 106 State law must yield whenever it is inconsistent with,
or impairs, the policy or provisions of a treaty or international agree-
ment.lo"
As international relations have grown increasingly complex, so
too have international treaties. Interpreting the thousands of obliga-
tions and duties imposed by these multiple treaties is made even more
difficult by the fact that parties to treaties will occasionally qualify
their consent to be bound by "reserving" specific treaty provisions.m
In essence, a reservation indicates a country's desire to be bound by
the treaty in general, with the exception of the particular provision to
which it reserved agairist. 10 This creates an extremely complicated
situation, particularly with respect to multilateral treaties, because not
all parties necessarily will agree on the permissibility of the reserva-
tion.'" Such debate concerning the legality of reservations is often
guided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna
Convention"). 111 This agreement, created with the intent of codifying
the development of treaty law, represents a valtiable source for inter-
preting treaties given the array of complicated questions that fre-
quently arise.'"
Beyond creating legal obligations between signatory nations,
treaties may occasionally give rise to the creation of customary inter-
national law, binding even on non-party states.'" Customary interna-
tional law is the result of practices consistently followed by the major-
ity of states because of a sense of legal obligation.'" Specifically, a
norm attains the status of customary international law only if two
conditions are met: the. norm must be (1) reflected in the general
practice of nations; 115 and (2) a sense of legal obligation ("opinioju-
106 See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
107 See U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
"18
 SeeWEsToN, supra note 102, at 91.
109 See id,
" 0 See id. at 91-92.
Ill See id. at 92; The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 reprinted in BURNS 1-1. WEsTonr ET AL., SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC
DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 69 [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion].
112 See Vienna Convention, supra note 111.
"3 See ICJ Statute, supra note 103; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 102 cunt. i (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
114 See ICJ Statute, supra note 103, art. 38; RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 102(2).
"5 See RESTATEMENT, 5/Ipra note 113, § 102. A "practice" need not he universally fol-
lowed in order to contribute to the creation of customary law. See id. cunt. b. Moreover, the
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/is") must have attached. 116 Even when these two conditions are met,
however, a country that indicates its dissent from a particular practice
or norm while the law is still in the process of development, is not bound by
the rule, even after it matures. 1 "
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized international custom as
a time-honored and essential component of binding international
law. 118 As early as 1900, in The Paquete Habana, the Court held that in-
ternational custom provided solid legal grounds for prohibiting the
capture of a foreign vessel. 119 In Paquete, a Cuban fishing vessel was
captured by a U.S. steamship and sold at auction as a prize of war. 129
Although no domestic law prohibited the capture, the Court reasoned
that as a result of ancient usage among civilized nations, "what origi-
nally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession .
[had become] ... a settled rule of international law" prohibiting the
capture of coastal fishing vessels. 121 Despite acknowledging several
occasions where the custom was ignored over the course of history,
the Court nonetheless concluded that the practice had evolved into
international law that the United States was bound to obey. 122
Eighty years later, in 1980, the Second Circuit's decision in Filar-
tiga v. Pena-lrala likewise found customary international law to be con-
trolling. 129 In Filartiga, the court held that deliberate torture perpe-
trated under the color of official authority violated universally
accepted norms of international law.'" The Filartiga case considered
whether the United States had jurisdiction over two non-citizens for
violent conduct they had undertaken as Paraguayan governmental
officials. 125 In answering this jurisdictional question, the court exam-
ined whether the alleged conduct violated customary international
practice of states that builds customary international law may inchtde what states do
through international organizations. See id. Rep. Note 2. For example, United Nations
General Assembly resolutions and declarations may, in sonic circumstances, contribute to
the process of forming international law. See id.'
"6 See id. § 102. Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official state-
ments) is not necessary; opiniajuris may be inferred from acts or omissions. See H.
117 See id. § 102 cmt. d. Historically such dissent and consequent exemption from a
principle has been rare. See id.
' '" SeeThe Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 707-08 (1900).
II" See id. at 694, 708.
12° See id. at 679.
121 Id. at 694.
122 See id. at 707-08.
123 See 650 F.2c1 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
154 see m
125 See id. at 880, 886. The aliens, citizens of the Republic of Paraguay, were served with
process within U.S. borders. See id. at 879.
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law. 126
 Acknowledging the universal condemnation of torture found
in numerous international agreements, multiple declarations of the
United Nations General Assembly, as well as the general renunciation
of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all the nations
of the world, the court held that torture violated an established norm
of international human rights law. 127
 Both of these cases indicate the
willingness of U.S. courts to find the existence of binding interna-
tional law even when its formation is not signified by explicit docu-
ments and terms.
The existence of international consensus, such as that discussed
in Paquete and Filartiga, likewise is important to the third source of law
identified by Article 38 of the ICJ: "general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations," commonly referred to as jus cogens. 128 Arti-
cle 53 of the Vienna Convention defines jus cogens as a standard "ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted."129 Thus, jus
cogens generally is considered to be derived from values held funda-
mental by the international community—an ideal of a "good per
se." 180 fits cogens is distillet from customary international law because it
is nonderogable—a country cannot avoid compliance with a jus cogens
norm by refusing to consent to its application."' As a result, jus cogens
prevails over and invalidates international agreements and other rules
of international law in conflict with its own nonderogable principles,
in this sense representing the strongest and most compelling source
of international law."2
' 26 See id. at 880.
127 See id. The court indicated that the right to he free of torture has become part of
customary international law evidenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See
id. at 882. The court found that the resolution created au expectation of adherence, and
insofar as the expectation was gradually justified by State practice, it may by custom be-
come recognized as laying clown rules binding on the states. See id. at 883.
use See 630 F.2d at 883; ICJ Statute, supra note 103, art. 38.
129 Vienna Convention, supra note 111, art. 53.
' 59 See David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of
Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 VALET Ir.et. L. 332, 351 (1988) (noting that fits cogens
is based on a rational ideal of the good per se, in contrast to jus disposititrum, which is based
merely on the fortuitous or self-interested choice of participating states).
11 See Vienna Convention, supra note 111, art. 53; RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 102
rep. note 6 (noting that being recognized by the international connnunity of states as a
whole means "by a very large majority of states, even if over the dissent of a very small
number of states").
"2 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 102 cmt. k; Sidertnan de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that jus cogens norms enjoy the high-
est status within international law).
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Evidence of the force of jus cogens as a source of international law
is further supported by U.S. common law." 3 In 1992, in Sideman u.
Republic of Argentina, the Ninth Circuit went even further than the
Second Circuit's Filartiga decision, holding that the prohibition
against torture had attained the status of a jus cogens nol.in.134 Sideman
involved the horrific actions of a violent and brutal anti-Semitic mili-
tary junta that ruled Argentina following the government of Maria
Peron."5 Seventy-five year old Jose Siderman was kidnapped, beaten
and tortured for seven days by members of the military junta. 136 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Argentina was not entitled to the immu-
nity afforded most sovereign acts because the prohibition against
official torture had attained the status of jus cogens—no derogation
front the norm was permissible. 137 Certain human rights have been
specifically identified as jus cogens norms by the Third Restatement of
Foreign. Relations Law. 138 These include: genocide, slavery, murder, tor-
ture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination,
and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights. 139 The Restatement provides, and cases have so
held, that any international agreement violating these peremptory
norms is void. 190
These three sources of international law—treaties, customary in-
ternational law and jus cogens—all operate to establish human rights
standards throughout the world. Before considering which sources of
law specifically prohibit the juvenile death penalty, it is first imperative
to understand the unique character of human rights law. 141 While in-
ternational jurisprudence traditiOnally insisted that the individual was
not a "subject" of international law, modern international laws have
created obligations for states in relation to natural persons. 142 Increas-
ingly, international human rights agreements create obligations and
responsibilities for states with respect to all individuals subject to their
jurisdiction, including their own nationals. 143 This reflects a general
133 See Siderman, 965 F.21.1 at 717.
134 See id.
1 " See id. at 703.
"6 See id.
137 See id. at 718, 723.
138
	 RESTATF.MENT, supra note 113, § 702.
I" See id.
'."' See id. § 702 cult. n; Sideman, 965 F.2(1 at 717.
141 See Schabas, supra note 92, at 312-13.
142 See RESTATEMENT, SUPla dote 113, intro. note, Part VII.
143 See id.; Schabas, supra note 92, at 311.
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consensus that how states treat individuals, including their own citi-
zens, is not the state's business alone, but is instead a matter of inter-
national concern and the proper subject for regulation by interna-
tional law.l+l
The uiiique character of human rights law, however, creates par-
ticular enforcement problems, particularly with respect to the afore-
mentioned treaty reservation process. 145 Although reservations are an
accepted feature of treaty law, they are fundamentally unsuited for
human rights treaties. 146 The reservation technique was developed in
the context of multilateral treaties concerned with preserving the
reciprocity of obligations between contracting states. 147 In the context
of human rights treaties, however, none of the parties are exchanging
rights or benefits, and reciprocity has no place. 148 This diminished
reciprocal character makes a country's ability to enforce treaty provi-
sions and human rights law extremely difficult, because -unlike tradi-
tional multilateral agreements, individual states have no coercive
power."6
III. DOMINGUES V. NEVADA
On October 22, 1993, sixteen-year-old Michael Domingues mur-
dered a woman and her four-year-old son. 150 In August 1994, a Nevada
jury found Domingues guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. 151
At seventeen years of age, Domingues was sentenced to death for each
of these murder convictions. 152 On appeal, in 1996, the Supreme
Court of Nevada affirmed the trial court's convictions and sentence. 155
The defendant then filed a motion for correction of an illegal sen-
tence, contending that the execution of a juvenile offender violates
the ICCPR and customary international law. 154 The District Court de-
nied the defendant's motion and, in a 3-2 decision, the Supreme
Court of Nevada upheld the District Court's conviction and death
sentence, concluding that the Senate's express reservation to the
114 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, intro. note, Part VII.
' 45 See Schabas, supra note 92, at 310-13.
Ho See id.
H7 
.See id. at 311.
145 See id. at 312.
145 See id. at 310-13.
' 5° See Domingues v. Nevada; 961 P.2d 1279, 1279 (Nev. 1998).
151 See id.
152 see id.
1" See id.
i54 See id.
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ICCPR preserved the United States' right to impose the death penalty
on juveniles. 155 The Supreme Court of Nevada failed to explicitly ad-
dress whether the reservation itself is valid, or whether the execution
of juveniles violates customary international law. 156
On March 1, 1999, Michael Domingues filed a petition with the
United States Supreme Court requesting certiorari to consider his
claims that the juvenile death penalty violates the ICCPR, customary
international law and fits cogens. 157 Upon reviewing this petition, the
Court asked the Solicitor General to file an ainicus brief presenting
the U.S. government's view of its international obligations related to
the use of the juvenile death penalty. 158 As international legal issues
surrounding the juvenile death penalty begin to receive heightened
attention, the Domingues petition and the response elicited from the
Solicitor General serve as key examples of the different sides of this
important debate. 159
A. Petition for Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Michael Domingues
As noted above, Michael Domingues' Petition for Certiorari ("the
Petition"), filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, argues that Nevada is
prohibited from imposing the death penalty on juveniles in light of
the ICCPR, customary international law and jus cogens. 16° hi address-
ing the alleged violations of the ICCPR, the Petition focuses on the
invalidity of the United States' reservation to Article 6(5)—the provi-
sion prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. 161 This claim is premised
on the fact that if the reservation is determined to be invalid, the
United States will be deemed to have accepted the terms of the treaty
155 See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280.
159 See id. Two dissenting Justices, compelled by concern over the validity of the reser-
vation to the ICCPR, supported a more thorough investigation of the Petitioner's claim. See
id. at 1280-81 (Springer, C.J., and Rose, j., dissenting). Chiefinstice Springer noted the
glaring incongruity of the United States becoming a party to the ICCPR while simultane-
ously rejecting one of its most vital terms. See id, (Springer, CJ„ dissenting). justice Rose,
noted that the complexity of the issue before the court deserved a full hearing on the ef-
fect of the U.S. reservation to the ICCPR, with the penultimate issue being whether the
Senate's reservation was valid in light of the nonderogability clause. See id. at 1281 (Rose,
J., dissenting)..
157 See Petition for Certiorari at 8, Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1276 (Nev. 1998)
(No. 08-8327) [hereinafter Cert. Petition].
158 See Request for Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 21, at 2044.
159 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157; Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23.
150 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 8.
181 See id. at 20-26.
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in its entirety, including Article 6(5) . 162 The Petition first contends
that the language of ICCPR prohibits any reservation to Article 6(5),
emphasizing that the . Article is specifically made nonderogable by the
treaty's terms. 163 As previously noted, while the ICCPR provides for
derogation from a number of its provisions in times of "public emer-
gency," Article 4 explicitly prohibits derogation from Article 6(5),
even in extreme circumstances. 164
 The Petition further asserts that the
U.S. reservation to Article 6(5) violates the "object and purpose" of
the ICCPR.I 65 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties explains
that any reservation that is "incompatible with the object and purpose
of the treaty" is invalid. 166 Again relying on the nonderogation clause
of Article 4, the Petition argues that Article 6(5) is of such paramount
importance to the treaty as a whole that any reservation to its terms
undoubtedly violates the object and purpose of the agreement.' 67
Furthermore, the Petition alleges that even if the reservation
were valid in substance, the Senate's reservation to the juvenile death
penalty provision was an unconstitutional violation of the separation
of powers doctrine. 168 Relying on Clinton v. New York, a 1998 U.S. Su-
preme Court decision that held the line-item veto unconstitutional,
the Petition argues that the Senate's ICCPR reservation process suf-
fered from deficiencies similar to those found in Clinton. 169 In Clinton,
the Court held that the President, acting alone, did not have the con-
stitutional authority under Article 1, section 7 (the Presentment
Clause) to alter the content of a bill by vetoing individual line-
items.'" The Petition contends that allowing the Senate to unilaterally
alter the provisions of the ICCPR represents precisely the same consti-
162 See id. at 26.
163 See id. at. 23-24; supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
164 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 23-24; supra notes 95-97 and accompanying
text.
165
 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 25-26.
166 See id.; Vienna Convent ion, supra note 111.
167 See Cert. Petition, supra Hole 157, at 25-26.
168 See id. at 20-22.
162 See id. at 22; 524 U:S. 417, 421 (1998).
170 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 22; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-50. The Present-
ment Clause states: "Every Bill which shall have passed the House ... and the Senate, shall,
before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President ... if he approves he shall sign it,
but if not he shall return it, with his Objections, to that House in which it shall have origi-
nated, who shall ... proceed to reconsider it...." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7. The Clinton Court
interpreted the Presentment Clause to mean that the President had no option to simply
alter the bill on his own, thereby making new law. See 524 U.S. at 439-50; Cert. Petition,
supra note 157, at 22.
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tutionally-prohibited activity rejected in ainton. 171 Moreover, the Peti-
tion argues that the Treaty Clause provides further evidence of the
unconstitutionality of the Senate's ratification, because the clause
does not contain any language suggesting that the Senate can "par-
ticularly consent" to a treaty by placing conditions on it that materially
alter a treaty proffered by other nations. 172
In addition to the arguments asserting the invalidity of the U.S.
treaty reservation, the Petition further proposes that international
custom provides alternative grounds for finding the practice of the
juvenile death penalty illegal. 173 The Petition claims that a consensus
against the juvenile death penalty has been clearly established by the
significant number of countries that refuse to partake in the "uncon-
scionable act [of executing juvenile offenders]," and also by the many
treaties and U.N. Resolutions codifying this prohibition. 174 The Peti-
tion emphasizes that the records from the drafting of the ICCPR indi-
cate that Article 6 indeed was considered by the drafters to be a
codification of existing customary international law. 175
Finally, the Petition uses the fact that the ICCPR makes Article
6(5) nonclerogable to argue that the prohibition against the juvenile
death penalty has risen to the level of jus cogens. 176 Not only is there an
international consensus prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, but
the nonderogation provision of Article 4 supports the conclusion that
departure from the consensus is prohibited. 177 The Petition notes that
in addition to the ICCPR, other international human rights treaties
similarly have made the provision prohibiting the juvenile death pen-
alty »onderogable, further emphasizing this quality.'" Moreover, both
the Inter-American Commission and the United Nations Special Rap-
porteur have each concluded that the juvenile death penalty is a per
se violation of jus cogens.I 79
171 See Cert. Petition, salsa note 157, at 22.
172 See id. at 6-7. The Treaty Clause provides that the president shall have the power
"by and with the Advice and Consent of Senate, to make Treaties...." U.S. CoNsT. art. II,
§ 2.
173 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 11-17.
17.1 See id, at 17.
175 See id. at 14.
172 See id. at 18.
177 See Id.
178 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 18.
179
 Sec id. at 18, 19. The Inter-American Commission monitors compliance with the
American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, a resolution adopted by the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS). See Donald Fox, InteMmeriron Commission on human Rights
rinds United States in Violation, 82 Awl 1NT'L L. 601, 601-02 (1988).
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Based on the aforementioned considerations, Domingues' Peti-
tion for certiorari concludes that the juvenile death penalty is prohib-
ited by three sources of international law: treaty, custom and jus co-
gens. 180 The Petition further asserts that while judges in every state are
bound to apply international law, the Nevada Supreme Court's deci-
sion upholding the death penalty as applied to Domingues, was part
of a pattern of state courts' "lack of awareness of United States inter-
national obligations." 181 The Petition thus concludes that it is precisely
this failure of state courts to recognize and adhere to such significant
international obligations that makes the issue of the juvenile death
penalty particularly ripe for Supreme Court resolution.' 82
B. The Government's Response to the Petitioner's International Law Claims:
Amicus Brief Filed by the Solicitor General
In October 1999, Solicitor General Steven Waxman filed an ami-
cus brief ("the Brief") on behalf of the United States, recommending
that certiorari be denied in the case of Domingues a Nevada. 185 The
Brief first addresses the validity of the Senate's reservation to ICCPR
Article 6(5), asserting that the reservation does not present a constitu-
tional problem, as alleged by the Petitioner.'" The Solicitor General
focuses on the language of the Treaty Clause to the U.S. Constitution,
which provides that treaty ratification is based upon the "advice and
consent of the Senate." 185 Thus, the Brief concludes that any altera-
tions offered by the Senate rest on solid constitutional ground.I86
More significantly, the Brief contends that the reservations to the
ICCPR were in fact suggested by the President himself, adopted verba-
tim by the Senate, thereby distinguishing the process at issue in Dom-
ingues from that of the "line-item veto" found unconstitutional in
Clinton v. New York.'"
The U.S. is a member of OAS and has ratified the OAS charter. See id. In 1987, the In-
ter-American Commission found that two juvenile executions in the United States violated
Article I of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man ("Every human being
has the right to life....") insisting that the rule prohibiting the execution of juvenile of-
fenders had acquired the authority of jus roger/5. See id.
I" See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 32-33.
181 Id. at 9.
182 See id. at 11.
183 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 7.
11° See id at 3.
183
 See id.
186 See id. at 3-4.
187 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 3; 524 U.S. at 439-50.
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The Solicitor General goes on to address the Petitioner's claim
that the reservation to Article 6(5) was invalid in light of the non-
derogation clause .and the "object and purpose" of the ICCPR. 188 The
Brief asserts that there is no correlation between the derogability of a
right and its importance or centrality to the treaty, contending that
several "profound" rights were not made nonderogable, such as the
right against arbitrary arrest. 189 Thus, the Brief concludes that the
mere fact that Article 6(5) is nonderogable does not suggest that a
reservation to its terms offends the treaty's object and purpose. 1 " Fur-
thermore, the Brief argues that if the parties had intended to prohibit
a reservation to Article 6(5), they would have done so "explicitly .. .
rather than ... obliquely."191 Given that the drafters of the ICCPR
chose not to expressly declare that any reservations to Article 6(5)
would be deemed invalid, the Solicitor General determines that the
reservation at issue is controlling as a matter of domestic law, empha-
sizing that courts have no authority to add provisions that were not
adopted by the other branches. 192 The Brief suggests that if other na-
tions are dissatisfied with the U.S. reservation, those nations may voice
their opposition. 193 While the Brief acknowledges that eleven states
have in fact made formal objections, it notes, "not one of the states
have declared that the treaty is not in effect between them and the
U.S. "194
In order to address the Petitioner's customary international law
argument, the Brief begins by distinguishing the Paquete Habana case
from the Domingues case in an effort to show that the customary in-
ternational law argument is inapplicable to Domingues. 195 The Brief
suggests that the Paquete decision is distinct because it articulated a
rule in a subject area—the adjudication of prizes of war—in which
federal courts traditionally devised rules in a common law manner. 198
The Brief argues that in contrast, with respect to the juvenile death
penalty, the Court had no occasion to determine the circumstances in
188 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra nOte 23, al 4.
189 See id. at 5.
199 See id.
191 Id.
192 See id. at. 4.
10 ' Sre Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 4.
1 " Id.
195 See id. at 5; supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text discussing the Paquele (led-
slot' and its implication§ with respect to customary international law.
199 See Solicitor General's Brief, sul•a note 23, at 5.
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which customary international law might preempt a state statute in an
area within the usual purview of the States, such as criminal law. 197
Moreover, the Brief suggests that the Domingues case does not
present an appropriate vehicle for the Court to address customary
international law issues. 198 The Solicitor General draws this conclu-
sion from what he regards as a deficiency in the lower courts' records
which he finds to lack probative materials concerning the develop-
ment of customary international law. 199 In light of this deficiency,. the
Brief asserts that there is nothing for the Court to refer to in deciding
whether international consensus exists prohibiting capital punish-
ment of juveniles, and whether such consensus, if it does exists,
reflects a sense of legal obligation requisite for the finding of custom-
ary law.2" The Solicitor General suggests that the Court is likely to
"benefit from the reasoned decisions of lower courts," emphasizing
that the Supreme Court of Nevada did not even address the custom-
ary international law issite. 201 In addition, the Brief argues that given
the Executive Branch's primary responsibility for conducting foreign
relations, the courts should defer to the Executive Branch regarding
whether a rule of customary international law is presently binding on
the United States. 202 Finally, the Solicitor General indicates that even
if a customary norm against the imposition of the juvenile death pen-
alty does exist, the United States is exempt from its terms as a "persis-
tent objector."203
The Solicitor General superficially addresses the issue of fits co-
gens, asserting for the second time that the Domingues case does not
present the appropriate vehicle for addressing the far-reaching con-
tention that the juvenile death penalty violates a jus cogens norm,204
The Solicitor General contends that neither the record nor the Su-
preme Court of Nevada's decision illuminate whether a jus cogens
norm has developed against the juvenile death penalty. 205 Thus, the
Solicitor General recommended that the U.S. Supreme Court deny
Michael Domingues' petition for writ of certiorari. 206 The Supreme
107 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 6,
201 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 6.
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 See id. at 7.
205 See id.
21)0 See Solicitor General's Brief; supra note 23, at 7.
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Court, apparently persuaded by this argument, denied the Domin-
gues petition on November 1, 1999. 207
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE
GRANTED CERTIORARI TO MICHAEL DOMINGUES
In light of the many powerful, compelling arguments made in
Domingues' petition, the U.S. Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari to provide guidance in the field ofinternational law. 208
While the Solicitor General's arguments are clear and concise they
lack sufficient substance to adequately counter the weighty human
rights violations alleged by the Petitioner. A major flaw in the gov-
ernment's position, set forth by the Solicitor General, was its failure to
recognize the legal limits of the treaty reservation process. 209 Al-
though the Solicitor General referenced the Vienna Convention as
the source of law establishing reservations as an accepted feature of
treaty law, he failed to adequately address the fact that the Convention
also prohibits reservations that conflict with a treaty's object and pur-
pose.2" The Solicitor General clearly overlooked Article 19 of the Vi-
enna Convention which provides: "[a] State may ... formulate a res-
ervation unless ... the reservation is incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty."211 Given the ICCPR's fundamental purpose of
recognizing the "inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family," there is a strong argument that a
reservation to any of these inalienable rights—such as the right to be
free from the juvenile death penalty—violates the treaty's object and
purpose. 212
Even acknowledging that reservations to substantive provisions in
human rights treaties are not universally deemed unacceptable, the
language of the ICCPR provides extremely persuasive evidence that
the drafters considered Article 6(5) fundamental to the object and
purpose of the treaty as a whole. 2 " In choosing to make Article 6(5)
2°7 Domingues V. Nevada, 961 P.2(1 1279, (Nev. 1998) cell denied, 526 U.S. 1156 (U.S.
Nov. 1, 1999) (No. 98-8327).
268 See Domingues, 961 I'.2d at 1281 (Rose, J., dissenting) (noting that federal court that
deals with federal law on daily basis might be better equipped to address issues of interna-
tional law).
209 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 4.
210 See id.
211 Vienna Convention, supra note 111, § 2 art. 19(c) (emphasis added).
212 See ICCPR, supra note 90.
213 SeegenerallySchabas, supra note 92, at 292,294-302.
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one of a small number of nonderogable provisions, the drafters em-
phasized its importance to the treaty. 214 The Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations specifically states that a country may not reserve against a
provision from which reservation is prohibited. 215 What is the non-
derogation provision if not an express prohibition against reserva-
tion?
It is difficult to comprehend the Solicitor General's contention
that the drafters could have prohibited reservation to Article 6(5) ex-
plicitly rather than "obliquely" through the use of the nonderogation
clause. 216 The statement: "no derogation shall be made from Article 6
. . ." appears perfectly direct and concise—it does not seem in any way
oblique.217 Moreover, there is no practical difference between stating
"no reservations to Article 6" and "no derogation from Article 6." 218
In all likelihood, the drafters reasonably assumed that the nonderoga-
tion clause served the same purpose as alternative language prohibit-
ing a reservation to Article 6. Furthermore, while the Solicitor Gen-
eral is correct in noting that certain other important rights were not
made nonderogable, this fact only bolsters the conclusion that Article
6(5) was of paramount importance—among a host of other critical
rights, the drafters chose to designate Article 6(5) as nonderogable,
furthering the position that the provision prohibiting the juvenile
death penalty is central to the object and purpose of the ICCPR. 219
The Human Rights Committee ("the Committee"), the commit-
tee created to monitor compliance with the ICCPR, supports the con-
clusion that the nonderogation of Article 6(5) was of critical impor-
tance.22° Not only did the Committee explicitly state that countries
may not reserve the right to execute children without violating the
object and purpose of the treaty, but in 1995 it issued a report
confirming that the United States' reservation to Article 6(5) was in-
valid. 2" According to scholar Nguyen Quoc Dinh, when a human
214 See generally id.
215
 See RESTATEMENT', supra note I t3, § 313 (1) (a).
216 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 5.
217 SeeICCPR, supra note 90, art. 4(2).
218 See id.
219 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 5.
22° See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24(52) Relating
to Reservations, 15 Hum. R'rs. L. J. 464-65 (1994) [hereinafter Human Rights Committee
Comments].
221 See id.; Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 24; Vega, supra note 11, at 755. In reaction
to the Committee's vote regarding the invalidity of reservations to Article 6, the U.S. Sen-
ate threatened to withhold funds slated for U.S. participation in the work of the Commit-
tee. See Dieter, supra note 2.
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rights treaty creates a control body, such as the Committee, that body
should be entitled to determine the legality of reservations. 222 In en-
acting the ICCPR all signatories, including the United States, agreed
to permit the Committee to monitor compliance with the treaty's
terms.223 Such acquiecense would have been meaningless and
misleading had the United States merely intended to ignore Commit-
tee conclusions and act contrary to their recommendations.
Further evidence of the incompatibility of the U.S. reservation to
the ICCPR may be found in opinions issued by the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights. 224 The Inter-American Court issued an advi-
sory opinion concerning Guatemala's reservation to the ACHR stat-
ing specifically, "a reservation which was designed to enable the State
to suspend any of the non-derogable fundamental rights must be deemed
to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and,
consequently, not permitted by it."225 The Inter-American Court ex-
plained that implicit in their opinion was the view that requiring res-
ervations to be compatible with a treaty's object and purpose is of
greater importance to human rights treaties, where reciprocity pro-
vides no protection for the individual against a reserving state. 226
Despite the many explicit manifestations that the reservation to
Article 6(5) violates the object and purpose of the ICCPR, the Solici-
tor General fails to substantively address the issue. He merely notes
"[elven if there were merit to [the arguments that the reservation is
ineffective for violating the treaty's object and purpose) ... that
would not mean that Article 6(5) should be enforced by a domestic
court in the face of the United States' reservation: 127 Essentially, the
Solicitor General suggests that regardless of the legality of the reserva-
tion, it should be controlling as a matter of domestic law. 228 Such strict
deference to the Executive Branch on this issue defies logic. One can
envision an extension of the Solicitor General's argument that con-
222 See Schabas, supra note 92, at 315.
223 See ICCPR, supra note 90, Part IV; Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 24.
224 See Edward Sherman, The U.S. Death Penalty Reservation to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible System Governing Decay For-
mation, 29 Thx. Itsur'L L. J. 69, 79 (1994).
225 Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion No. OC.-3/83 of Sept, 8, 1983, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ter.
A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 3 (1983), reprinted in 23 320, 341 (1984); see
Sherman, supra note 224, at 79.
226 See Sherman, supra note 224, at 79.
227 Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 4.
228 See id.
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Bones even more atrocious human rights violations, as long as the.
President and Senate concur to reserve such provisions in an interna-
tional human rights treaty. Moreover, the Solicitor General's conten-
tion seems to fly in the face of the American system of checks and bal-
ances, ignoring the unlikelihood that the Executive Branch will
perceive its own violations 229
 Similarly, by claiming that courts lack
authority to add provisions that were not adopted by other branches,
he also ignores the fact that the Court is not called upon to add the
juvenile death penalty provision to the ICCPR.23° Indeed, the provi-
sion is well embedded and, as previously noted, quite central to the
existing treaty. 231 The Court is merely asked to examine the legality of
a U.S. reservation negating an existing provision, an issue well within
the Court's province.232
 The fundamental constitutional law principle
that "Di t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is," allows for judicial interpretation in
this context, and is conspicuously ignored by the Solicitor Genera1. 233
As an additional defense of the U.S. reservation, the Solicitor
General notes that other nations are in a position to protest the reser-
vation to Article 6(5) by declining to recognize themselves as being in
treaty relations with the United States.294 His reliance on this form of
protest fails to acknowledge the unique character of human rights
treaties, rendering such a suggestion highly impractical. 235 As previ-
ously noted, international human rights treaties are distinct from tra-
ditional multilateral treaties because they are not created to accom-
plish the reciprocal exchange of rights for mutual benefit. 296 Parties
to human rights treaties.do not confer benefits onto one another, but
instead onto their own citizens, making it perfectly illogical to suggest
that a country protest the U.S. reservation by making its own reserva-
tions. 237
 If conforming countries suddenly were to start executing
their own juvenile offenders, not only is this unlikely to influence U.S.
229 See Youngstown Sheet 84 Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (reviewing execu-
tive order to possess and operate nation's steel mills).
230 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 4.
231 See ICCPR, supra note 90, art 6(5).
232 See Marbly. ), v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch) 137, 177 (1803).
233 See id. (noting further that if two laws conflict with each other, the courts must de-
cide on the operation of each).
234 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 4.
233 See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text discussing the unique character of
human rights law.
236 See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text; Schabas, supra note 92, at 311;
Sherman, supra note 224, at 79.
237 See Schabas, supra note 92, at 311.
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behavior, it clearly is contrary to the intent of the ICCP12, 238 Similarly,
if protesting countries were to declare the treaty not in effect between
themselves and the United States, the only measurable result would
be a dramatic decline in the treaty's overall applicability. 259 Although
this strategy may achieve results where parties to a traditional multi-
lateral treaty are conferring benefits onto each other and thus have
significant bargaining power, it probably would be ineffective in co-
ercing U.S. compliance, because the United States does not stand to
lose any tangible benefit. Thus, the Solicitor General's suggestion that
other nations decline to recognize themselves as being in treaty rela-
tions with the United States is fundamentally ill-suited in the context
of international human rights agreements. 24°
If the reservation is invalid, recognized sources of international
law—including legal scholarship, case law and state practice—require
that the United States be hound by the treaty as a whole, including
Article 6(5). 241 As noted by Judge R. St. John MacDonald of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, "No exclude the application of an ob-
ligation by reason of an invalid reservation is in effect to give full
force and effect to the reservation." 242 A reservation found invalid
under international law has no independent validity and the separate
states of the United States are bound by the Supremacy Clause to en-
force the provisions of the treaty in its entirety. 243 Consequently, U.S.
states currently are bound by the ICCPR as a whole, which prohibits
the execution of juvenile offenders.
When the issue of U.S. legal obligations under the ICCPR is
combined with the strength of the Petitioner's customary interna-
tional law claim, the argument in favor of granting certiorari is even
more compelling.244 The norm against the juvenile death penalty
235 See id.
ESA See id.
240 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 4. Furthermore. while the Solicitor
General seems to belittle the fact tint only eleven countries have formally objected to the
U.S. reservation, since objecting to a reservation has no legal consequence, it is quite likely
that many objections are never made. See Human Rights Committee Comments, supra note 220,
at 465.
241 See Schabas, supra note 92, at 324.
242 See id. at 317.
245 See U.S. CONS•. art. VI. The Supremacy Clause reads in relevant part. "[AM Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the fudges in every State shall be bound thereby. . ." Id. (emphasis
added).
244 See supra notes 179-176 and accompanying text discussing creation of customary
law and Petitioner's customary international law claim.
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clearly fulfills the three specific components that contribute to the
development of customary international law: (1) the custom is
reflected in the practice of nations (2) a sense of legal obligation, or
opiniojztris, has attached, and (3) the United States is not exempt as a
"persistent objector" to the noriit. 245 Although it often is difficult to
quantify at what point a general practice evolves into a customary
norm, international consensus against the juvenile death penalty is
easily perceived.
For instance, this first element of the customary international law
doctrine easily is established by the fact that the United States has the
dubious distinction of being one of only six countries still imposing
the juvenile death penalty, and is moreover, the world leader in juve-
nile executions. 246 The fact that five other countries engage in this
reprehensible practice is insufficient to destroy the norm; as the Third
Restatement notes, "a practice can be general even if it is not universally
followed."247
 Similarly, as the Paquete case demonstrated, custom can
evolve into law despite occasions when the custom is not adhered
to.248 In August 1999, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary executions confirmed that this consensus in-
deed had evolved, noting that governments which continue to use the
death penalty against minors "are particularly called upon to bring
their domestic legislation into conformity with international legal stan-
dards. "249
Similarly, an agreement among a large number of parties can in-
dicate the existence of consensus, giving rise to a new customary rule
of law binding even on non-party states. 250 The ICCPR, CRC, ACHR
and Fourth Geneva Convention all have provisions specifically prohib-
iting the execution of children for crimes committed before the age
of eighteen. 251 In particular, the ICCPR and the CRC have received
245 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 102.
245 See Death Penalty Worldwide, supra note 39, at Table of juvenile Offenders; AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, Action at the United Nations, AI Index: 53/04/99, Sept. 1999 [hereinafter
Action at the
247 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 102 cm'. b.
24g See 175 U.S. at 707-08.
249 See The Death Penalty Worldwide, supra note 39 (emphasis added).
2" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 324 ant. e; ICJ Statute, supra note 102, art. 38.
251 CRC, supra note 90, art. 37(a) ("Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment
without the possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons be-
low eighteen years of age"); AC1IR, supra note 90, art. 4(5) ("Capital punishment shall not
be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years
of age"); The Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 90, art. 68 ("[T] he death penalty may
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near universal endorsement, with 144 and 191 signatories respectively,
providing au especially strong indication of international consensus
against the juvenile death penalty. 252
 Moreover, these treaties are not
merely mild expressions of human rights law; the ICCPR in particular
is considered the most important human rights treaty in existence. 255
The U.S. State Department praised it as "the most complete and
authoritative articulation of international human rights law that has
emerged in the years following World War II."254 The authority of this
treaty not only makes U.S. refusal to abide by its terms more embar-
rassing, but likewise makes the consensus more obvious. When such a
complete articulation of human rights is produced it can he assumed
to represent an international consensus.
Others indications of international consensus include United
Nation resolutions such as Safeguard 3 and Resolution 1999/4. 255
Safeguard 3, of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights
of Those Facing the Death Penalty, was adopted by the U.N. Eco-
nomic and Social council in 1984. 256 The Safeguard notes, "[p]ersons
below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime shall
not be sentenced to death ... ."257 Similarly, the U.N. Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted Resolu-
tion 1999/4 in August 1999, condemning "unequivocally the imposi-
tion and execution of the death penalty on those aged under 18 at
the time of the commission of the offence."258 Resolution 1999/4
draws attention specifically to the United States' isolated position on
the juvenile death penalty, noting that in 1998 the United States was
the only country known to have executed a juvenile offender. 259
not be pronounced against a protected person who is under eighteen years of age at the
time of the offence").
252 See Dieter, supra note 2 (noting near universal endorsement of ICCPR). Although
Norway and Ireland originally reserved against Article 6 of the ICCPR, Norway has since
withdrawn its reservation and Ireland has abolished the death penalty entirely. See &halms,
salmi note 92, at 290-91; Juveniles and the Death Penally, supra note 42, at 2 (noting that as of
November 1998, 191 states had become parties to CRC). Indeed, the U.S. and Somalia are
the only parties not to have ratified the CRC. See Dieter, supra note 2.
255 See Dieter, supra note 2.
254 See id.
255 See Juveniles and the Death Penalty, supra note 42; Action at the United Nations, supra
note 240.
256
 See Juveniles and the Death Penalty, supra note 42,
257 See id, Although this resolution is not legally binding, its adoption by the General
Assembly (resolution 39/118) without a vote, was a sign of strong consensus among
lions that its provisions should be observed. See id.
258 See. Action at the United Nations, supra note 246..
259 see id.
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United Nations' resolutions are recognized both by the Third &state-
ment and by U.S. case law as contributing to the formation of custom-
ary norms. 260 The volume and weight of these . many indicators pro-
claims the truth about the practice of the juvenile death penalty: from
all angles, all across the world, the execution of juvenile offenders is
being prohibited, leaving the United States as the most flagrant trans-
gressor of this prohibition.
Although consensus may be adequately perceived through obser-
vations of general practice within the international community, it is
slightly more difficult to establish the second element necessary for
the creation of customary law: opiniojuris. 261 This is because it can be
difficult to distinguish between habitual practices that are regarded as
binding "legal obligations" and those that result simply from courtesy
or diplomatic protocol. 262 Typically, in the human rights field, prac-
tices that are made legally binding are deemed such because of a
shared sense of moral reprehensiveness of the practice. 263 Most likely,
therefore, the prohibition against the juvenile death penalty is rooted
in a deep sense of moral condemnation for the practice, based on
many of the previously discussed notions—the backgrounds of juve-
nile offenders, their relative culpability and the justifications for capi-
tal punishment. 264 It may be argued that opinio jutis is thus implicated
by the shared sense of moral condemnation that has compelled most
countries to create laws and treaties prohibiting the juvenile death
penalty. 265
The establishment of opinio juris does not require explicit evi-
dence.266
 Instead, a sense of legal obligation may be inferred by acts
or omissions. 267 In this instance, a sense of legal obligation may be in-
ferred from the fact that the majority of countries have ceased to per-
form juvenile executions, coupled by the fact that multiple provisions
of human rights treaties unequivocally forbid the practice 2 68 These
mo See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 128; RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 102, rep. n.1 (noting
that U.N. resolutions contribute to the process of Forming customary international law and
demonstrate consensus).
261 See Nanda, supra note 76, at 1333 (noting Joan 1.1artman's observation that opinioju-
ris poses the most troubling problem in constructing an intellectually honest and convinc-
ing theory for customary human rights norms).
162 See Vega, supra note II, at 757.
" See id.
264 See generally Nanda, supra note 76, at 1333-34.
265 See id. at 1333.
2'6 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 114, § 102.
262
 See id.
268 See id.
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treaties can be assumed to reflect the intentions of the drafters—the
countries of the world—that the treaty provisions universally be ap-
plied as binding international law. 269 In choosing to include the juve-
nile death penalty provision, therefore, the drafters recognized the
existence of a legal obligation to refrain from executing juveniles. 270
Significantly, evidence within the preparatory work of the ICCPR,
conclusively indicates that the drafters considered Article 6 to be
merely a codification of existing customary law. 27 i
Accepting the establishment of the first two elements of custom-
ary international law (state practice and opinion juris) the only remain-
ing question concerns the assertion that a country who has persis-
tently objected to a norm is not bound by its terms. 272 Despite the
Solicitor General's suggestion, the United States cannot hide behind
the claim of "persistent objector."273 Although the United States' re-
fusal to ratify the ACHR and CRC and its reservations to the 1CCPR
could suggest the United States has acted as an objector, such an ar-
gumeit ignores the underlying requirements of persistent objection
in international law. 274 In order to qualify as a persistent objector, a
nation must protest a norm during the process of its creation, thus making
the United States' 1992 reservation to the ICCPR meaningless under
persistent objector analysis. 275 At the time of the negotiation, drafting
and opening for signature of the ICCPR and the ACHR, not only did
the United States fail to protest, but U.S. policy at the time actually
indicated support for prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. 276 Dur-
ing this critical time period, the United States had discontinued its use
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. 277 The United States only
resurrected the juvenile death penalty after it had signed the ICCPR,
although before it had ratified the treaty.278 Once a country signs a
treaty, however, it implicitly agrees that it will follow the terms of the
treaty and not pass laws that contradict treaty provisions—despite the
269 See id. at 1333-34; Vega, supra note 11, at 757.
270 See grnerally Nanda, supra note 76, at 1333-34; Vega, supra note 11, at 757.
271 See Cell. Petition, supra note 157, at 14. The preparatory works to the 1CCPR reflect
the drafters' discussions during the treaty formation process and therefore serve as sup-
plementary means of interpretation, similar to legislative histories. See id.
272 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 13, § 102.
27s
	
Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 4.
274 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 102 cmt.
27U
	 Vega, supra note I I, at 758-59.
276
277 See id.; Nanda, supra note 76, at 1332. From 1964 to 1983, the U.S. did not execute a
single juvenile. See Nanda, ,supra note 76, at 1319.
278 See Vega, supra note 11, at 759.
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fact that the treaty technically is not the law of the land until
ratified.279
 Given the apparent acquiescence evidenced by national
practice, and lacking any contrary evidence of documented protest,
international law prohibits the United States from labeling itself a
persistent objector. 280
Reinforcing this conclusion, the United States actually supported
the U.N. General Assembly resolution recognizing Article fi as ex-
pressing a "minimum standard" for all member states. 281 Similarly,
during the drafting of the ACHR, not only did the United States fail
to object to the prohibition of the death penalty for juvenile offend-
ers, but rather the United States argued that setting a specific age
limit went against the trend of abolishing the death penalty alto-
gether. 282
 These statements indicate that, far from protesting the
norm, the United States adhered to the norm's standards.
It is significant that the Solicitor General's brief barely addresses
the substance of these customary international law arguments, instead
relying on the distinction between the current debate and the use of
customary international law in the Paquete case.283 The Brief accu-
rately points out that in this context the Court would need to find,
not only that customary international law controls, but that it over-
rides specific state statutes enacted to legalize the death penalty. 284
This fact, however, in no way indicates that such a finding is impossi-
ble. 285 State law must yield when it is inconsistent with international
law. Moreover, the Solicitor General's assertions regarding
deficiencies in the lower court's record and redundant separation of
powers arguments appear to be attempts to avoid addressing the sub-
stance of the customary international law argument. 288 The repeated
suggestion that "courts should defer to the position of the Executive
Branch as to whether a rule of customary international law is pres-
ently binding on the United States...." again ignores the fact that the
279 See id.; Vienna Convention, supra note 111,  art. 18 (noting that a state is obliged to
refrain front acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty when it has
signed the treaty and has not clearly made known any intention not to become a party to
the treaty).
286 See Vienna Convention, supra note 111,  art. 18; Vega, supra note 11, at 759.
281 SeenOVCE, CAPITAL PUNISIIMENT: A WORLD VIEW 196-217 (1961).
282 See Vega, supra note 11, at 758.
2M See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 5.
214
 See id.
285
 See id.
286 See id. at 5-6.
September 20001	 Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law 	 1209
issue is a legal question, clearly within the province of the courts. 287
Indeed, deferring to the Executive Branch as the Solicitor General
recommends is more likely to violate the separation of powers given
that the Executive Branch is unlikely to adequately perceive its own
violations of international law. 288 Common law has shown that the ju-
diciary is indeed the proper branch to decide when a norm has
evolved into customary international law, just as it did in Paquete and
Filartiga.289
Moreover, while the Solicitor General suggests that the Court de-
lay review until a more complete record has been developed, he ne-
glects to perceive the circularity of this recommendation. 299 Given the
documented pattern of state courts' lack of awareness of U.S. interna-
tional obligations, such a record is unlikely to ever develop and state
courts will continue to look for federal guidance before addressing
this issue."' In addition, relying on state courts to decide novel issues
of international law, creates a major risk that international law will not
be applied uniformly.292 As recognized by the Human Rights Commit-
tee, the absence of formal mechanisms for the implementation of
treaty rights in the United States may lead to an unsatisfactory appli-
cation of the human rights treaties throughout. the country. 293 This
most certainly undermines the recognized need for uniformity and
federal supremacy in the interpretation of international law. 294 Phillip
Jessup, former judge and noted international law scholar, cautioned
that, given this need for uniformity, rules of international law should
not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. 295
Until the U.S. Supreme Court addresses the pressing issue of the ju-
venile death penalty within the context of international law, it remains
likely that such an absence of uniformity will continue to exist. It is
also problematic that lower courts, like the Supreme Court of Nevada,
will continue to avoid addressing the complicated international law
287 Id.; see Martnny, 5 U.S. at 177.
288 See Marbuq, ri U.S. at 177.
289 See 175 U.S. al 694; 630 F.2d at 880.
290 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 5-6.
291 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 9. It is similarly questionable whether elected
state judges have sufficient political independence to decide against their cot' stitttellig
(who generally support the death penalty) despite the demands of international law,
292 See id,
299 See id. (referencing United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Comments on the
United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCI'R/79/Add.50 (1995)).
2" See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbaiine, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
295 See Phillip Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law,
33 Am. J. INT'L L. 740,740-43 (1939).
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arguments in juvenile death penalty cases until they receive guidance
on the issue. 296
 As justice Rose of the Supreme Court of Nevada noted
in her dissent to Domingues: "A federal court that deals with federal
law on a daily basis might be better equipped to address these is-
sues. . —"297
 In order to promote consistency and uniformity and to
provide the guidance sought by lower courts, particularly in light of
the extreme gravity of the issues involved, the U.S. Supreme Court
should have granted certiorari to Michael Domingues.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY DEBATE
While the Domingues Petition highlights a number of persuasive,
ripe legal issues that should be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Petition also has flaws.298
 To the extent that the Petition attempted
to set forth all potentially relevant arguments on Domingues' behalf,
it was successful. The next petitioner, however, may be better served
by eliminating certain weaker arguments in order to emphasize the
most compelling grounds for review. Most significantly, Domingues'
legislative argument—which criticizes the Senate's ratification proc-
ess—is unpersuasive in comparison to his allegations focusing on the
object and purpose of the ICCPR. 299 -
By asserting an unconvincing argument regarding the ratification
process, the Petitioner opened the door to forceful rebuttal from the
Solicitor General, which likely captured the Court's attention in con-
sidering the opposing perspectives. 309
 The Solicitor General summa-
rily attacked the Petition's assertion that the ICCPR ratification was
invalid."' His observation that the reservation to Article 6(5) did not
originate in the Senate, but.rather was submitted to the Senate by the
President himself and adopted by the Senate verbatim, persuasively
confronts the Petitioner's contention that the Senate unconstitution-
ally omitted or modified any part of the treaty. 302 Moreover, as the
Brief notes, the Senate has the constitutional authority to reserve its
consent to part of a treaty negotiated by the President: the Constitu-
296 The Supreme Court of Nevada declined to even address the customary interna-
tional law or jus cogens argument presented by Domingues. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1279-
81.
297 Id. at 1281 (Rose, J., dissenting).
298
 SeeCert. Petition, supra note 157.
299 See id. al 5-8.
300 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 3-1.
30! See id. at 3.
302 See id.; Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 5-6.
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tion provides that the President "shall have Power by and with the Ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties. ..."3" Thus, the
President enters into a treaty only after the Senate has provided its
feedback—if the President objects to the reservations imposed by the
Senate, then he need not accept the Senate's "advice."304 The Brief
convincingly distinguishes the ICCPR ratification process from the
line-item veto found unconstitutional in Clinton, noting in particular
that the Senate's practice of attaching reservations to its consent to
treaties has extensive historical pedigree, dating back to the Jay Treaty
of 1794. 305
The Petitioner's contention that the juvenile death penalty vio-
lates jus cogens similarly rests on ambiguous legal ground because the
juvenile death penalty is arguably distinguishable from other norms
that have attained the status of jus cogens. 306 In certain respects, this
argument may be quite forceful—if the practice does indeed violate a
jus cogens norm, there is no possible justification for U.S. actions—
however, it is possible to articulate and organize this argument better
than it was framed in the Domingues Petition. 307 Jus cogens has been
described as, "those rules which derive front principles that the legal
conscience of mankind deems absolutely essential to coexistence in the in-
ternational community." 308 This statement is obviously powerful and ex-
treme, as are the acts identified by the Restatement as violations of jus
cogens: genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion, systematic racial discrimination, and consistent patterns of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. 300 These prac-
tices arguably are distinguishable from the practice of the juvenile
death penalty. There is a strong argument that juvenile offenders eli-
gible for the death penalty cannot necessarily be labeled "innocents"
in the same sense as victims of genocide or torture. It may be ex-
tremely difficult to convince a factfinder—privy to the sordid details
of a brutal crime perpetrated by a juvenile defendant—that the juve-
303 U.S. CONS•''. nit. 11, § 2 (emphasis added); we Solicitor General's Brief, supou note
23, at 3.
384 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 3.
505 See id. at 4 (referencing the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, No 19,
1794, 8 Stat. 116).
3°0 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 18-20; RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 702.
3°7 See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 18-20.
308 See Karen Parker, ins Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'1,
& COMP. L. Rev. 411, 415 (1989) (quoting statement made by Mexican delegate to the
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties) (emphasis added).
300 SeeRESTATEMEN • , supra note 113, § 702.
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nile death penalty truly is equivalent to the norms specified in the
Third Restatement or implicated by U.S. common law."
On the other hand, while imposing punishment for a severe
crime is distinct from acts of genocide, there are nonetheless forceful
arguments supporting its inclusion as a jus cogens norm. For one,
there is significant data to sustain the conclusion that the administra-
tion of the death penalty reflects a pervasive pattern of "systematic
racial discrimination."" This century, seventy-five percent of all juve-
nile offenders executed- were African American." The U.N.'s Special
Rapporteur made similar observations following his 1997 visit to the
United States, decrying the evident racial bias in the use of the death
penalty." Similarly, the U.S. Justice Department's review of the fed-
eral death penalty, released in September 2000, indicated numerous
racial disparities.s" In particular, the report noted that eighty percent
of the cases submitted by federal prosecutors for death penalty review
involved racial minority defendants." These facts lend support to an
argument that the juvenile death penalty represents not a new cate-
gory of jus cogens, but instead a violation of the existing jus cogens
norms prohibiting systematic racial discrimination. 316
 A similar argu-
ment exists with respect to the final jus cogens norm noted by the Re-
statement: gross violations. of internationally recognized human
rights. 317
 As previously noted, many countries prohibit the juvenile
death penalty on human rights grounds and the continuance of its
use in the United States currently may be, or certainly may become, a
gross violation of these internationally recognized human rights stan-
dards.
A number of scholars and several human rights organizations
agree with the notion that the juvenile death penalty violates jus co-
3 '° See id.; Sideman, 965 F.2d at 717.
3" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 113, § 702; NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH THE
DEATH PENALTY. The U.S. leads the world in killing kids (visited Apr. 15, 2000) Chttp://
www.ncadp.org >.
312 See NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, The U.S. leads the world
in killing kids (visited Apr. 15, 2000) <Intp://www.ncadp.org ›; see also, Streib, supra note 1.
313 See Dieter, supra note 2. The International Commission of Jurists also noted, "the
administration of capital punishment in the United States continues to be discriminatory
and unjust...." See id.
319 See DPIC, supra note 8 (visited Oct. 7, 2000) at chttp://wmv.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/whatsnewittml >.
315
 See id.
318 See RESTATEMENT, ROM note 113, § 702.
317 See id.
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gens.318 Although the United States is not a party to the ACHR (be-
cause it has not yet ratified the treaty), as a member of Organization
of American States (OAS), the United States is subject to the recom-
mendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 519
In 1987, the Commission found the United States in violation of jus
cogens for the execution of two juvenile offenders, James Roach and
Jay Pinkerton, both 17 at the time of their offenses, 32° Although opin-
ions of the Inter-American Commission are not binding, the recom-
mendation nonetheless represents an interpretation by au authorized
body of independent experts of an international agreement to which
the United States is a party."' Therefore, while there are distinct un-
certainties surrounding the advancement of a jus cogens argument, it is
nonetheless worthy of assertion as an additional basis on which to al-
lege the illegality of the juvenile death penalty. A future petitioner,
however, should specifically tailor the argument to emphasize either
the inherent racial discrimination or gross violations of human rights
norms implicated by the juvenile death penalty.
Filially, future petitioners will be the lucky beneficiaries of pass-
ing time, which in the case of the juvenile death penalty, may be an
influential factor. As time passes and the custom against the juvenile
death penalty continues to gain momentum and recognition, not only
will this strengthen the Petitioner's customary international law ar-
gument, but it will open the door for renewed constitutional chal-
lenges. Inherent in any discussion of customary norms is the fact that
these "customs" reflect an evolving standard of decency, thus return-
ing the death penalty discussion to the constitutional issues raised in
Thompson amid Stanford. 322 Although the constitutionality of the juve-
nile death penalty already has been addressed by the Court, the very
standard chosen by which to gauge cruel and unusual pimishment-
evolving standards of decency—demands that the issue be reconsid-
ered to reflect changes as the world "evolves." 323 By virtue of the ter-
minology, the Court clearly recognized that the standard by which a
practice is evaluated should grow in order to reflect changes in soci-
.SeeNanda, supra note 76, at 1329.
319 See id.
52° See id.; The inter-American Commission found the existence of jus rogens based on •
the fact that the norm against the juvenile death penalty is accepted by the member states
of the OAS. See Fox, supra note 179, at 602.
"1 See Fox, supra note 179, at 603.
322 See 492 U.S. at 361-405; 487 U.S. at 815-39.
323 See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying discussion of the Stanford and Thompson
challenges.
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ety's perceptions and attitudes.324 Indeed, the Stanford Court only
reached the conclusion it did after considering whether a "modern
societal consensus" forbidding the juvenile death penalty existed.325
There is a strong argument that what might not have existed as a
modern consensus in 1989, has evolved into such today. As noted in
Weems, It] ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purpose... . "326 Although there remains the hurdle presented by
the Stanford decision—,that "American standards of decency are dis-
positive"--changing compositions within the Court and an increas-
ingly international .world, increase the possibility that evolving stan-
dards of decency may be interpreted in a broader sense. 327 As U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Breyer recently noted in consideration of a
death penalty case, "[the Supreme Court] has long considered as
relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied
standards roughly comparable to our own. . . . "28
Similarly, as we move ahead in time, it is possible that state courts
will become increasingly aware of their obligations under interna-
tional law and a record evidencing the conflict of the juvenile death
penalty with international law will evolve. Although as early as the
Paquete case, Justice Gray noted: "International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction ..." this clearly is not always the case today. 329
Nonetheless, the failure of the state courts to uphold international
law appears to be receiving greater attention. 330 In 1998, on the
fiftieth anniversary of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, President Clinton felt compelled to note: "It shall be the pol-
icy and practice of the Government of the United States, being com-
mitted to the protection and promotion of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, fully to respect and implement its obligations under the
international human rights treaties to which it is a party, including the
324 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
S25 See hi.
326 See 217 U.S. at 373-74.
327 See 492 U.S. at 370.
329
 Knight v. Florida, No. 98-9741,1999 U.S. Lexis 7479, *16 (1999) (Breyer, j. dissent-
ing).
329 175 U.S. at 700; 961 P.2d 1281, (Rose, J., dissenting).
33° See Cert. Petition, supra note 157, at 9 (noting the failttre of Supreme Court of Ne-
vada to enforce treaty was consistent with pattern of lack of awareness of United States
international obligations).
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ICCPR...."351
 International legal scholars and commentators have
observed the necessity and importance of enforcing international law
obligations in all courts of this cOuntry. 332 Recently, Justice O'Connor
emphasized this fact noting, "domestic courts should faithfully recog-
nize the obligations imposed by international law." 3"
In addition, an increasing need to ensure that international obli-
gations are upheld may arise from the costs sure to accrue from per-
sistent U.S. violations of this international standard. Costs to the
United States will.include loss of leadership and prestige, endanger-
ment of U.S.. citizens abroad, disrespect for international law and a
lost opportunity to be part of a fundamental change in the status of
human rights at the start of the twenty-first century. 334
 Similarly, as
emphasized by German Justice Minister Herta Daeubler-Gmelin, the
United States may be forced to recognize that "respecting interna-
tional laws cannot be a one-way Street."3" The United States depends
on international cooperation and, therefore, the costs of continued
human rights violations may soon become too great to bear. As the
stakes become higher, there will be increasing pressure for state
courts to observe these international obligations. This pressure may
produce the more thorough record that the Solicitor General favors
prior to granting certiorari. 356
CONCLUSION
It has been said that, "the quality and future of society and the
degree to which human dignity values are fulfilled may be measured
by the protection ... accorded young members of the population." 337
Despite paying lipservice to the idea that children are entitled to spe-
cial protection and care, the government has significantly failed
331 See DPIC, supra note 8, (visited Apr. 13, 2000) at <Intp://wsmdeathpenaltyinfo.
org/dpic/dicintl.html >.
332 See Celt. Petition, supra note 157, at 9.
333 See id, at 9-10 (quoting Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL Comm 13, 18 (1996) and noting further, "[dile
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives legal force to foreign treaties,
and our status as a free nation demands faithful compliance with the law of free nations.").
334
 See Dieter, supra note 2.
335 See id. at 21. This statement. was made in the process of announcing a suit against
the United States in the International Court of Justice for the execution of two German
nationals in September 1999. See id,
336 See Solicitor General's Brief, supra note 23, at 5-6.
Lung-chu Chen; The United Nationi Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Policy-
°Hewed Overview,•7 J. 1dusi. RTS. 16, 19 (1989).
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to ensure that the legal rights of children are respected. The United
States has declined to ratify two key human rights treaties and has re-
served against an essential provision in the ICCPR, one of the most
important human rights treaties currently in existence. The United
States similarly refuses to acknowledge indications that customary in-
ternational law and jus cogens prohibit the juvenile death penalty.
Nowhere is the United States in such clear and direct conflict
with international law as with the execution of juvenile offenders. The
international community has adopted minimum standards to govern
the conduct of states based on the precept that human rights are an
international responsibility, not simply an internal matter. Legally, the
United States cannot continue to resist these international standards
and the judiciary is the proper branch to demand U.S. adherence.
Despite contrary claims; the United States is bound by the ICCPR in
its entirety, and is similarly bound by customary international law, to
prohibit the practice of executing juvenile offenders. Currently, the
United States remains stubbornly committed to its position on this
issue. With hope, however, the next Petitioner can benefit from in-
formation in the Solicitor General's brief and use this knowledge to
persuade the Court that the time has come to 'demand U.S. compli-
ance.
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